

Between network and complex organization: The Making of Neoliberal Knowledge and Hegemony

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1. Neoliberal Hegemony: is it all over now, or only contested?

The hegemony of neoliberal discourse and practice – the claim of the superiority of the market mechanism and competition-driven processes of capitalist development over state-driven pathways of social and economic organization, the limitation of government to the protection of individual rights, especially property rights, privatisation of state enterprises and the liberalization of formerly strictly regulated and government administered markets – has been challenged in different national and international arenas around the globe. Failures of “shock therapies” in Eastern European transition economies, the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and the collapse of the dot.com market certainly have not aided arguments in favor of self regulation and private enrichment as beneficial to all. Some observers have – somewhat prematurely, to be sure, considering recent successes of the neoliberal right in Italy and France, for example – suggested that the rise of new social democratic parties to power in various European countries constituted the end of neoliberalism (equated with Thatcher/Reagan government policies). Nobel Prizes in economics in recent years – previously awarded to hard-core neoliberal thinkers such as Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan, and Becker – have gone to the likes of development economist Amartya Sen and World Bank insider-turned-critic Joseph E. Stiglitz. These developments, along with others, have been interpreted by some as indications that a “post-Washington consensus” is emerging, reinserting an ethical dimension into the holy triad of global “liberalization, privatisation and deregulation” (Higgott 2000). Last but not least, the Enron collapse linked to the bursting of the bubble economy and the protectionist moves of the US government of George W. Bush after the September 11 attacks¹ certainly helped to undermine the legitimacy of global neoliberal agendas.

The recent rise of myriad social movements protesting what is denounced as corporate-led globalization may have to be regarded as the most successful challenge to neoliberalism thus far. Flexible networks of protest movements have followed the call from Chiapas in 1994 to engage in a global battle against neoliberalism and capitalist globalization (see Klein 2002). Critical analysis of a variety of issues has been undertaken by these new left social movements and to some extent bundled to popular demands (such as the so called Tobin tax). Albeit far from a coherent program for a global alternative to neoliberalism, social protests at about every meeting of the World Bank, IMF, G-7, World Economic

¹ The Bush administration’s protection of the US steel and agricultural sector (in the form of subsidies and increased tariffs on imports) triggered similar moves on the part of the European Union and generated considerable hostility in many countries, e.g. in Mexico, where large demonstration of Mexican farmers denounced the hypocrisy of the US’s free trade rhetoric and demanded similar subsidies from their government.

Forum, WTO, and European Union conferences have attracted much media attention, leading to speculation that neoliberal hegemony is in decline (see Brand in this volume).²

Still, we will argue in this paper that an end to neoliberal hegemony³ is not yet in sight. Though neoliberal paradigms and policies are increasingly contested due to structural transformations of neoliberal capitalism and challenged by new social actors opposing neoliberal globalization, core aspects of neoliberal hegemony remain in place and are likely to grow stronger in the near future in various arenas, such as the European Union. We attribute the continuing strength of neoliberal paradigms in particular (though by no means exclusively, see Carroll and Carson on global corporations and corporate elite policy groups in this volume) to well-developed and deeply entrenched networks of neoliberal knowledge production and diffusion, intellectuals and think tanks.

These networks of intellectuals and think tanks constitute a salient feature in the analysis of agents and structures of neoliberal globalization, as well as the globalization of neoliberalism.⁴ While Kees van der Pijl and Leslie Sklair, for example, have theorized transnational processes of elite integration and class formation in recent works, a transnational class concept that focuses mainly on corporate and political elites is both too broad and too narrow to shed light on other crucial factors sustaining neoliberal hegemony, namely well organized networks of neoliberal knowledge production and dissemination operating in relative autonomy from corporate and political centres of power. A predominantly corporate transnational class concept is too broad because conflicts between different forces and orientations within the ruling classes and global elites are underestimated, and too narrow because the important contribution of radical neoliberal intellectuals, scientists and “second-hand dealers in ideas” (Hayek 1949: 221) has not yet been adequately taken into account. Leslie Sklair (2001: 24) recognizes the role of intellectuals like Hayek and others of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) in orchestrating the neoliberal counter-revolution against social-liberal and Keynesian welfare state thinking, but his subsequent analysis of transnational class formation processes is hampered by his predominant focus on corporate actors. While his emphasis on the role of culture in class formation processes avoids narrow class definitions relying on material interest, his focus on “consumerism” as a central integrating factor should be considered but one of a set of cultural expressions of neoliberalism.

² The 2003 World Economic Forum is paralleled for the third time by the Porto Alegre Global Social Forum. Whereas the social movements in Porto Alegre are certain to celebrate the win of the Brazilian presidency of labor activist and PT leader Lula, the WEF crowd is contemplating how to regain trust lost for the globalization project (New York Times, 24 January 2003).

³ We employ the term “hegemony” in Gramsci’s sense suggesting a system of rule based on a high degree of consent of the ruled (rather than based on force).

⁴ Susan Strange correctly observed that the “power derived from the knowledge structure is the one that has been most overlooked and underrated. It is no less important than the other three sources of structural power [military, production, finance] in the international political economy but is much less well understood. This is partly because it comprehends what is believed (and the moral conclusions and principles derived from those beliefs); what is known and perceived as understood; and the channels by which beliefs, ideas and knowledge are communicated – including some people and excluding others.” (Strange 1988: 115)

Kees van der Pijl (1995 and 1998) has intensively discussed global elite planning groups, such as the Trilateral Commission and the Bilderberg Group on the one hand, and the organized network of neoliberalism constituted by the Mont Pèlerin Society on the other. In his more recent contribution, van der Pijl (1998: 129-30) moved beyond a sometimes rather too homogeneous representation of global planning groups by way of highlighting a number of important aspects that set the MPS network of organized neoliberals apart. Firstly unlike Bilderberg, the MPS did not restrict itself to serving as a forum for the articulation of still nascent ideas, but instead offered coherent principles for a foundational ideology (*Weltanschauung*). Secondly unlike other “planning groups,” MPS relied on the mass dissemination of knowledge and ideas. Alas, while van der Pijl correctly observes the integration of influential members in think tanks around the globe and the coordination of think tank efforts under the umbrella of the Atlas Foundation, he dismisses this effort as transparently ideological. His assessment that the MPS network depends “on the dissemination of a largely preconceived gospel” (van der Pijl 1998: 130) underestimates the ability of MPS intellectuals to engage in serious research, scientific projects and knowledge production, as well as the strategic and tactical capacities of neoliberal networks. The correctly observed “militant intellectual function” – different from the “adaptive/directive role in the background” (van der Pijl 1998: 130) of other planning groups – does not only or even mainly stem from firm ideological principles, but from the ability of the neoliberal MPS network to engage in pluralistic (albeit neoliberal pluralistic) debate in order to provide a frame for a whole family of neoliberal approaches (such as ordo-liberalism, libertarianism, anarcho-capitalism etc.), and its innovative approach to generating and disseminating new knowledge. In the latter regard, the rise of the new type of “advocacy think tank” as an organizational form distinct from traditional supply systems of scientific, technocratic, and partisan knowledge (e.g. academic and state-planning related knowledge centres and political parties) is critical for processes of knowledge production, distribution and circulation (see Smith 1991; Ricci 1993; Stone 1996). The strength of these neoliberal networks results from their ability to articulate the core principles of Neoliberalism in a trans-disciplinary fashion not only in the arenas of “political society”, but also in the wider power arenas of “civil society” as well (Gramsci).

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we will provide a descriptive analysis of the development of the Mont Pèlerin Society network of organized neoliberals itself. From its humble origins, the group which contained 38 intellectuals at its founding in 1947 has developed into a truly global network with over 1,000 members total so far. Second, we will introduce the origins and the concomitant rise of neoliberal advocacy think tanks closely connected to individuals or groups of MPS members. In the third section, we will provide a brief example of the process of well organized activities using the example of the network’s efforts on the issue of European integration. This discussion allows us to examine and assess both the strength and the limits of organized neoliberals in the contemporary phase of contested neoliberal hegemony.

2. The creation and institutionalisation of neoliberal knowledge: Experts and “second-hand dealers” in ideas

Despite socialist revolutions, the Great Depression and other clear indicators of capitalist development's failures in the 1930s, neoliberal intellectuals insisted that the "free market" was a superior mechanism for interactions, exchange and production, and promoted the extension of market mechanisms through the valorization and commercialization of many aspects of public and even private life. At the core of the neoliberal agenda remained a deep scepticism about the scope and reach of the state, particularly with regard to welfare and redistributive policies, though the "neo" of "neo-liberalism" indicates an acknowledgment of the state's appropriate and necessary function in safeguarding capitalism (Walpen 2004: 62-83). Wilhelm Röpke, for instance, explicated two meanings of liberalism: a) a movement away from feudal institutions and toward greater social mobility and personal freedom, and b) the advocacy of laissez-faire capitalism and a radically individualist view of the social order. He embraced the former and rejected the latter. "Hence, Röpke and his allies came to adopt terms such as "neoliberal", "social market", "humane economy, and "Third Way," to describe their programs (Zmirak 2001: 13). Thus the neoliberals learned from the experiences of earlier right wing liberal traditions, and wanted to overcome the previous dualist "state/economy" perspective that dominated liberal thinking in the pre-WW II era. Much like Hayek and other right wing liberals, Röpke also understood that "economics had been irreversibly politicised":

The growth of mass democracy, the mobilization of millions of men of every social class during the First World War, rising nationalist sentiment and class mistrust – all these currents had joined to overwhelm the levee behind which classical liberals had hoped to protect economic life from the turbulence of politics. No longer would it be enough to convince the economics professors, the King's ministers, and the responsible classes of the virtues of the free market.

(Zmirak 2001: 11)

Therefore, paradoxically, the neoliberals recognized the growing need "to organize individualism". Unlike previous power elites, neoliberal intellectuals and business men were not at the centre of political and economic power in the post-war "Lockean heartland" to use Kees van der Pijl's (1995) language for the capitalist center (which was under heavy influence of Keynesianism and social liberal conceptions of welfare state capitalism except Germany, compare Hall 1989). Neoliberals exercised even less influence in the "Hobbesian contendor states" formed after WW II in the more or less peripheral areas of the second and third world experimenting with anti-colonialist disintegration from the world market and socialist trajectories. A small group of concerned liberals met in 1938 in Paris invited by the French philosopher Louis Rougier to discuss Walter Lippmann's book *The Good Society* (compare the important work by Denord 2001 and 2003). A total of 26 intellectuals participated in this early effort to create a framework for the innovation of liberalism. Fifteen of the 26 intellectuals (among others Raymond Aron, Louis Baudin, Friedrich August von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Michael Polanyi, Wilhelm Röpke, and Alexander Rüstow) would participate in the founding of the Mont Pèlerin Society nine years later in 1947.

Lippmann's core message was a principled statement of the superiority of the market economy over state intervention, which anticipated Hayek's much wider recognized argument in his 1944 book *The road to Serfdom*. Unlike later theories of totalitarianism emphasizing the absence of pluralist/democratic principles (e.g. the approach by Hannah Arendt and their successors), the binary opposition of "market" versus "planned" economy was introduced to warn against a society under total control no matter whether organized according to Marxist-Leninist or Keynesian principles. To invoke the re-institutionalization of market mechanisms, Lippmann also anticipated Hayek's long-term strategy. Only steadfast, patient and rigorous scientific work and a revision of liberal theory were regarded as a promising strategy to eventually beat "totalitarianism." At the 1938 meeting, participants discussed names for the new philosophy in need of development and suggested a variety of terms, such as "positive liberalism." At the end, the group agreed on the term "neoliberalism" giving the term both a birthday and an address. Another concrete result of the deliberations was the founding of the *Centre International d'Études pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme*, an early think tank effort of neoliberal intellectuals which would not survive the turmoil of the Second World War (Denord 2001 and 2003).

By 1947, the time was ripe to renew the 1938 effort. Under the leadership of the Swiss business man Albert Hunold and Friedrich August von Hayek, a number of hitherto more loosely connected neoliberal intellectuals in Europe and the United States assembled in Mont Pèlerin, a small village close to the Lake Geneva. The immediate internationalist outlook and organisation effort was possible due to some corporate/institutional support. The *Foundation for Economic Education* in Irvington-on-Hudson (which dated from 1946 and employed Ludwig von Mises among others) and the *William Volker Fund* founded in 1944 and based in Kansas City provided for such bases, as did the London School of Economics (where Lionel Robbins and Hayek taught) and the University of Chicago (where Milton Friedman and other relevant figures held posts). The Volker Fund was headed by later MPS member Harold Luhnow and provided travel funds for the US participants in the meeting. Travel money for the British participants of the second meeting in Seelisberg, Switzerland, was secured from the Bank of England.⁵

What was the rationale for the founding of the Mont Pèlerin Society? The key paper for understanding this effort had been written by Hayek himself. He presented his article "The Intellectuals and Socialism," which would be published in 1949, at the second meeting of the Society. In this paper, Hayek refines the general analysis of the threat to freedom and democracy resulting from "the revolt of the masses" (Ortega y Gasset) and of the threat to elite control and capitalism as a whole resulting from the "politicisation of economics", by focusing on education and knowledge. He specifically underlines the role of intellectuals, institutions, and ideas for the rise of socialism. In classical Fabian tradition, the policy turn towards socialist principles is explained by the influence of socialist intellectuals on decision makers. The time preceding socialist politics is described as a phase "during which

⁵ Letter from Alfred Suenson-Taylor to William E. Rappard (March 16, 1949, in: Swiss Federal Archive, Berne, J.I.149, 1977/135, Box 48; see Walpen 2004: 107).

socialist ideals governed the thinking of the more active individuals.” (Hayek 1949: 221)
Once the intellectuals turn to socialism, it is only a

question of time until the views now held by the intellectuals become the governing force of politics. [...] What to the contemporary observer appears as the battle of conflicting interests has indeed often been decided long before in a clash of ideas to narrow circles.

(Hayek 1949: 222)⁶

Hayek did not, however, propose a purely idealistic conception relying on great intellectuals as the driving force of history. Instead, he underlines the role of institutions, networks and organisations. Rejecting the conventional wisdom that intellectuals wield only limited influence, he explains that the traditional role of scientists and experts has been replaced by an

all-pervasive influence of the intellectuals in contemporary society [which] is still further strengthened by the growing importance of ‘organization’. It is a common but probably mistaken belief that the increase of organization increases the influence of the expert or specialist. This may be true of the expert administrator or organizer, if there are such people, but hardly of the expert in any particular field of knowledge. It is rather the person whose general knowledge is supposed to qualify him to appreciate expert testimony, and to judge between the experts from different fields, whose power is enhanced.

(Hayek 1949: 224)

Hayek observes the rapid spread of such institutions breeding intellectuals (and not experts) such as universities, foundations, institutes, editors and other knowledge spreading organisations such as journals etc. “Almost all the ‘experts’ in the mere technique of getting knowledge over are, with respect to the subject matter which they handle, intellectuals and not experts” (224). The role of intellectuals as knowledge filters and disseminators is according to him a “fairly new phenomenon of history” and a by-product of the mass education of the non-propertied classes. Due to their social status and experiences, such intellectuals or “second-hand dealers in ideas” (221) are leaning towards socialism. Hayek particularly elaborates on the influence of journalists who, he contends, counteract the controlling power of the non-socialist owners of the media.

Hayek emphasizes the strength of liberal values in Germany unlike Great Britain (in the immediate post-war era), which he attributes to the former country’s experience with fascist

⁶ Hayek cited Keynes analogous insight from the *General Theory* (1936: 383-4) at the MPS founding conference: “The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”

dictatorship. As part of his effort to de-legitimize socialist ideas and principles, he proceeds by way of equating fascism and socialism:

Does this mean that freedom is valued only when it is lost, that the world must everywhere go through a dark phase of socialist totalitarianism before the forces of freedom can gather strength anew? It may be so, but I hope it need not be. Yet so long as the people who over longer periods determine public opinion continue to be attracted by the ideals of socialism, the trend will continue. If we are to avoid such a development we must be able to offer a new liberal program, which appeals to the imagination. We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure, a deed of courage. What we lack is liberal Utopia, a program which seems neither a mere defence of things as they are nor a diluted kind of socialism, but truly liberal radicalism which does not spare the susceptibilities of the mighty (including the trade unions), which is not too severely practical and which does not confine itself to what appears today as politically possible. [...] The practical compromises they must leave to the politicians.

(Hayek 1949: 237)

Hayek draws two conclusions from his analysis, which can be regarded as the guiding principles of the neoliberal organizing, networking and institutionalisation effort. Firstly, the “right” lacks capable scientists and experts able to match the rising stars of social liberal and socialist orientation (such as Lord Keynes and Harold Laski in England). This problem can only be overcome if a strong effort is made to rebuild anti-socialist science and expertise in order to develop anti-socialist intellectuals. Secondly, the socialist filter in the knowledge disseminating institutions of society, universities, institutes, foundations, journals, and the media has to be attacked by the establishment of anti-socialist knowledge centers capable of effectively filtering, processing, and disseminating neoliberal knowledge.

The first task was taken on by the Mont Pèlerin Society, which assembled “intellectuals”, mostly scientists but also “practical men,” including businessmen, editors, professional journalists and politicians. The second task was tackled primarily for a long time by way of helping to found and run “independent” institutes, foundations, journals etc. promoting neoliberal knowledge: The core institution in this realm represents a deliberate effort to breed a fairly new type of civil society knowledge apparatus: the *advocacy think tank*.

2.1. Expert networking: An introduction to the Mont Pèlerin Society

The MPS did not establish a full-fledged academic or even political program. Instead, its membership of neoliberal intellectuals agreed on a set of core principles recorded as a statement of aims. The six core principles were:

- 1) The analysis and explanation of the nature of the present crisis so as to bring home to others its essential moral and economic origins.

- 2) The *redefinition of the functions of the state* so as to distinguish more clearly between the totalitarian and the liberal order.
- 3) Methods of re-establishing the rule of law and of assuring its development in such a manner that individuals and groups are not in a position to encroach upon the freedom of others and private rights are not allowed to become a basis of predatory power.
- 4) The possibility of establishing minimum standards by means not inimical to initiative and the functioning of the market.
- 5) Methods of combating the misuse of history for the furtherance of creeds hostile to liberty.
- 6) The problem of the creation of an international order conducive to the safeguarding of peace and liberty and permitting the establishment of harmonious international economic relations.

(Hartwell1995: 41-2, emphasis added)

Notably absent are a number of traditional liberal core principles relating to basic human and democratic rights (e.g. “collective organisation”, equality in political participation, etc.). From 1947 on, the society organized yearly conferences either of “global” or “regional” scale. Aspiring members required the support of two existing members in order to join MPS. Attempts of some members (notably Hunold and German economist Röpke) to have the MPS speak out politically in the public were blocked by an alliance led by Hayek in the 1950s. Thus the principle to engage only in scientific debate has been preserved through to the present. The only publicity for the Society itself was and is launched by members who work in major newspapers, such as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Le Monde*, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and *Financial Times*. While clearly not a secret (or even conspirational) society, the members decided to preserve as much privacy as possible to enable an open discussion and to promote rigorous internal debate. A side effect, though probably not an unwelcome one, is that public attention is directed at the individual contributions of neoliberal scientists as opposed to the collaborative and institutionalized efforts of the neoliberal scientific and discourse community.⁷

Based on member lists available at the Liberaal Archief in Gent (The Netherlands) and other MPS internal documents available at the Hoover Institute in Stanford (USA), as well as Internet based research (many members proudly announce their membership in the MPS), we have assembled a profile that introduces the scope and content of the MPS network of neoliberal intellectuals.

Total membership comprises 1,025 individuals, 933 members are male and 48 are female (for 44 names no gender could be identified). Thus approximately 91 per cent of MPS

⁷ An argument made in the 1960s and 1970s about the rise of the scientific power elite was rejected as a chimera by Peter Weingart (1982). According to Weingart, the scientification of politics immediately led to the de-institutionalization and politicization of Science and thus potentially resulted in a loss of expert influence. Although his point (notably similar to Hayek’s argument) is well taken, Weingart fails to account for the rise of specific discursive communities such as the one organized by the Mont Pèlerin Society.

members are male. The distribution of members according to countries is illustrated in table 1.

Table 1: MPS membership by country

Countries			
USA	437	Columbia	3
Germany	95	Costa Rica	3
Great Britain	93	El Salvador	3
France	69	India	3
Japan	41	Ireland	3
Switzerland	37	Norway	3
Italy	26	Portugal	3
Spain	23	Poland	3
Argentina	22	Uruguay	3
South Africa	19	Russia	3
Austria	17	Luxemburg	2
Sweden	17	Finnland	2
The Netherlands	16	Turkey	2
Australia	15	Bahamas	1
Guatemala	15	Ecuador	1
Venezuela	15	Egypt	1
Belgium	14	Greece	1
Canada	11	Hungary	1
Chile	11	Israel	1
Brazil	10	Island	1
Mexico	10	South Korea	1
Taiwan	10	Thailand	1
New Zealand	7		
Cuba	4		
Tschech Republic	4		
Denmark	4		
Peru	4		
China	4	N/A	12

Source: Compiled by authors from Membership lists of the MPS available in the Liberaal Archief, Gent. The total number (1107) exceeds the number of MPS members (1025) due to relocations.

As table 1 makes clear, the network is global in scope, though a strong concentration of membership can be observed in the United States (437 members amount to 39.4 per cent of the total), followed by Germany, UK, France, Japan and Switzerland. A significant and rising number of members live outside the heartland of developed capitalism. Most recently, new members have been recruited in the post-socialist countries of the former Soviet bloc. Table 2 provides an overview according to world regions and shows that the

MPS is clearly most strongly represented in Western Europe and North America, though a quite impressive presence can be observed in Latin America as well. In 1951, four years after the organization's founding, the MPS had members on all continents, with a strong concentration in the US and in Europe. Argentina and Mexico were the first countries in Latin America with MPS members. Guatemala's participation dates from 1966; by 1991, it was second only to Argentina as the Latin American country with the most members. From the 1970's onwards the development of membership in Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica is remarkable. In Africa the MPS has – with the exception of a single member at the end of the 1950's in Egypt – its exclusive anchoring in South Africa. Japan is the MPS centre in Asia. Starting in 1957 with a single member Asian membership reached 24 by 1991. Besides Japan the MPS' representation in Asia is notable in Taiwan, where the number of members grew from two in 1966 to 10 in 1991 (see Walpen 2002). In the meantime, India's importance is growing. In the 1980's members from Australia and New Zealand were added. The importance of the Austral-Asia region is reflected by the creation of the "Special Asian Regional Meetings." The first meeting was held in Bali, Indonesia in 1999 and the second, in Goa, India, took place at the beginning of 2002. In Europe we observe the increase of members especially in Spain and Eastern Europe.

Table 2: MPS membership in world regions

North America	458
Europe	438
EU	383
Eastern (former socialist) Europe	11
Latin America	105
South America	69
Central America and the Caribbean*	21 22 (26)
Asia	60
Australia	24
Africa	20

* with/out Cuba until 1959

Source: see table 1.

In addition to its progress in terms of an expanding membership (both in terms of numbers and global reach), the MPS network has also managed to initiate both short- and long-term research projects on an individual as well as on a collective level (such as in the meantime competing versions of an *Index of Economic Freedom* coordinated and published yearly by the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation). Normally, the impetus for such research projects comes from MPS, whereas think tanks implement them either alone or in collaboration (the Fraser Institute led effort is a joint product of many think tanks around the globe; see Walpen 2004, ch. 4-6).

Table 3 provides data on the major fields of occupations of MPS members. We can distinguish the academic field, advocacy think tanks, business, government/politics, media, international organizations and associations as important clusters. Not surprisingly, most members are employed at universities, many in economics departments.⁸ Only the members involved in academia outnumber the members who are employed in advocacy think tanks founded and/or promoted by MPS members holding leadership functions (serving on boards etc.). A sizeable group is employed in corporations or business associations, followed by government employees and media people. An interesting aspect is the cross-field aspect of members employed in the management of money, be it in business (commercial banks), government (central banks) or international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Certainly the core contribution of MPS members Milton Friedman (USA) and Sir Alan Walters (UK) in monetary theory and politics (“monetarism”) attracted quite a number of “practical men” to an international society which remains quite selective in its efforts to include corporate and political leaders.

⁸ Apart from the predominant group of economists among the MPS members, considerable numbers are found in law and philosophy departments. Further disciplines include History, Sociology, Theology, Agronomy, Biology, Chemistry, Engineering, Mathematics, Physics, Political Science, Psychology, other Social Sciences, and Zoology. The academic training and involvement of about two thirds of MPS members remains to be researched.

Table 3: MPS members' major fields of occupations

Occupations	
University	438
Economics*	299
Law	32
History	10
Business Schools	3
Colleges	12
Think Tanks, Foundations	132
Business	96
Including	
Banking	20
Business Associations	17
Government/Politics	43
Including	
Central Banks	6
Presidents	4
Judges	4
Ambassadors	2
Media	38
Including	
Newspapers, Weeklies	26
Publisher	3
Radio	2
TV	1
International Organizations**	11
IMF	6
World Bank	7
Other Associations	5
N/A of 1025	4

Source: See table 1, additional research on individuals.

* 19 can be directly recognized as “public choice” economists.

** Some members served both at the IMF and the World Bank.

Apart from the numerous ties of MPS members to more than 100 think tanks, foundations and neoliberal societies organized on a national basis (e.g. the US Philadelphia Society or

the German F. A. von Hayek Gesellschaft), MPS members participate in other global elite groups such as the *World Economic Forum (WEF)* with eleven members participating so far. Despite a shift of elite planning groups such as Bilderberg and the Trilateral Commission towards their own varieties of neoliberalism, no significant overlap can be reported with regard to these groups.⁹ The MPS members seem to prefer the maintenance of a separate global “network of networks” (Pasche and Peters 1997) committed to more original, pure and radical version of neoliberalism. However, links do exist to corporate elites in the International Chamber of Commerce, which can be described as a core group of “conservative neoliberalism” (see Carroll and Carson in this volume).

The neoliberal insight that the influence of socialism is not restricted to economic doctrines finds a clear expression in the wide field of discourses and sciences covered by the Mont Pèlerin Society. Indeed, there is hardly a subject of general scientific, philosophical or practical political matter that the MPS has not covered in its meetings, activities, and member publications. An index of 32 major MPS meetings between 1947 and 1998 (the last being the 50 year “golden anniversary” meeting) yields the following list of topics discussed at one or various sessions.

⁹ Germany’s Alfred Müller-Armack, one of the early members of MPS appears to be one of the few who attended Bilderberg conferences.

Table 4: Clustered Subjects at 32 MPS Meetings 1947-1998

•*Economic Topics*

Monetary Order
Gold Standard
Central Banks
Fiscal Policy and Taxation
Methodological Questions
Teaching Economics

•*State and Welfare State* Education

Health Care
Pension System
Privatization

•*Philosophy of Liberalism* Liberal Tradition

Free Society
Moral Questions
Christianity / Religions
The image of entrepreneurs

•*Politics*

Agriculture
Europe, European
Integration and EU
Germany
Migration
Under-developed Countries

•*Law*

Rule of Law
Law and Economics
Liberal order

•*Neoliberal Knowledge Production, Policy and Agenda Setting*

Strategies and Tactics
Deliberate discussion of influence, policy and work of think tanks

•*Socialism*

Planned Economy
Calculation
Political development
and influence of communism

•*Labour and Trade Unions* • *Keynesianism* • *Enemies of the Market*

Environmentalism
Feminism
Interventionism
Theology of Liberation

Source: Own clustering of topics discussed at MPS meetings, compiled by Liberaal Archief, Gent.

Of course one can also highlight some individual MPS members who are well known public officials such as Vaclav Klaus, Czech president and former head of the government, or Antonio Martino, the current minister of defense of Italy in the Forza Italia government of Silvio Berlusconi; Germany's ex-chancellor Ludwig Erhard or Italy's former president Luigi Einaudi; the EU Commission's single market official Frits Bolkestein. One could also highlight the total of eight Nobel Prize-winning economists who are or were members of the Mont Pèlerin Society¹⁰, much like Eric Lundberg, an official of the Central Bank of Sweden who was instrumental in creating the separate Prize based on funding from the Swedish Central Bank – The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel – which benefits from the renomme of the Nobel Prize (Lebaron 2002). It is more important, however, to understand that the strength of this transnational neoliberal discourse community derives not from the highly visible and publicly acknowledged experts in politics or science and scholarship; rather, neoliberal hegemony is produced and reproduced through an expansive network that ranges across diverse institutional arenas, including academia, business, politics, and media. A viable ideology or “*Weltanschauung*” cannot be generated by purely academic work; neither can it result from purely practical fields. It is the interrelation of the different areas important to hegemony, which can generate a crucial influence if the members of the network can agree on core principles and a common ground (as expressed in the MPS' *Statement of Aims*), and then work towards their “liberal utopia” through a clearly defined division of intellectual and practical labor. Members actively share information, educate each other on a wide range of issues and discuss critical matters in pursuit of neoliberal “solutions” to troubling questions to be promoted in appropriate channels (via service of individual members in policy and corporate advisory functions, through think tanks and media channels etc.). What we hold as the MPS's core principle of pluralism in principled neoliberal confines can be regarded an important aspect with regard to internal as well as wider public(ized) discussions. While attempts are made to resolve conflicts on critical issues, conflicting views can also prevail as long as they are not in contradiction to the overall principles.

The decision of the MPS *as an organization* to not become directly involved in the political sphere additionally has helped to keep the society integrated by avoiding potential conflicts among members who might disagree on any specific issue, while agreeing on the MPS's general guiding principles. No matter which party is in power in any particular country at any given time, the society remains dedicated to its mission of articulating the neoliberal position on any question, which becomes a critical issue of public importance. Some times more than others, neoliberal experts are closer to the government in power, but even then the immediate exercise of power is not the concern of the network. This “weakness” compared to other global elite groups can be regarded as the main difference as well as the core strength of the MPS' effort to reproduce and constantly mobilize neoliberal

¹⁰ The Prize winners are Hayek (1974), Friedman (1976), George J. Stigler (1982), Buchanan (1986), Maurice Allais (1988), Ronald H. Coase (1991), Becker (1992) and Vernon L. Smith (2002).

knowledge, and to develop neoliberal futures and planning capacities.¹¹ This relative “political absenteeism” should not be misunderstood, however. It was clear for Hayek and his colleagues from the beginning that the task of translating neoliberal expertise into usable knowledge (such as policy proposals) should be well organized. For this purpose, the 132 MPS members working in think tanks and the links of many more MPS members to a total of more than 100 think tanks and foundations, not to mention media organizations etc., are crucial. It was not a strategy of “infiltration” of existing institutions, which yielded this sizeable group of neoliberal “second-hand dealers in ideas” (Hayek 1949: 221) and knowledge filterers, but rather a self-conscious effort to build up “independent” capacities. Many members of MPS found financial support from practical people to organize a still growing army of neoliberal advocacy think tanks.

2.2. Think tank networks and the strategic placement of neoliberal intellectuals and knowledge filters

We have already mentioned the first neoliberal think tank, the *Centre International d'Études pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme* which was organized in the late 1930s and failed to survive WW II.¹² This effort was renewed in the 1950s when British businessman Antony Fisher approached Hayek, offering his help to promote neoliberalism. Fisher supplied the seed money to set up the *Institute of Economic Affairs* in London, the prototype of the many neoliberal advocacy think tanks that followed throughout the world.

Think tanks¹³ have been recognized in the comparative study of political systems in a number of pioneering contributions from several scholars (see Stone and Garnett 1998). Studies have explained the fundamental contribution of think tanks to the transformation of politics for example in the US (Ricci 1993); in depth studies have shown the “new ideological divide” (Smith 1991) as well as the extent of neoliberal/neoconservative¹⁴ control capacities of elite networks during the Reagan and Bush administrations in the United States (Burch 1997a, 1997b and 1997c; Diamond 1995). Scholars have scrutinized the role of neoliberal think tanks in the policy process in general (Desai 1994; Cockett 1995) and with regard to individual policy issues such as privatisation (Stone 1996) and deregulation (Plehwe 2000). Compared to early studies, which documented the “social movement” character of neoliberalism as an organized endeavour to build up a “counter

¹¹ While many left wing social movements did not escape the integrative powers of “parliamentarization”, the neoliberal right seems to have learned the lesson with regard to the necessity of autonomy to avoid disintegration by way of absorption.

¹² The ‘prototype’ of an think tank-like organization is the Fabian Society. Neoliberals like Hayek learned a lot of the Fabians (Cockett 1995: 111-2).

¹³ Compare about the term „think tank“, a very long “definition” of think tanks and different types Stone 1996, ch. 1. Attempts to universally define the term “think tank” in a concise way are bound to fail due to substantial differences between scientific, technocratic and partisan varieties.

¹⁴ Edwin J. Feulner, head of the Heritage Foundation and long time secretary treasurer as well as president of the MPS vividly describes the problem of the term *neoliberal* in the US context. „The Mont Pelerin Society was founded ... to uphold the principles of what Europeans call ‚liberalism‘ (as opposed to ‚statism‘) and what we Americans call ‚conservatism‘ (as opposed to ‚liberalism‘): free markets, limited governments, and personal liberty under the rule of law.“ (Feulner 1999: 2)

establishment” against the Keynesian welfare state (Blumenthal 1986; Cockett 1995), much of the more recent work by and large fails to grasp the importance of the institutionalisation of advocacy think tanks in securing neoliberal hegemony. Emphasis is placed instead on innovative capacities generated by think tanks, the wide range of opinions available from and thence an alleged pluralism with regard to advocacy think tanks (Gellner 1995, Stone 2000, McGann and Weaver 2000).

Certainly a number of relatively new institutes of the left, e.g. the Center for Policy Alternatives founded in Canada in the 1980s or the – much more modest in scale and scope – recently established foundation WISSENTransfer (knowledge transfer) in Germany as well as quite impressive think tanks and networks operating in the realm of the “new social democracies” (e.g. the “Stockholm Progressive Summit”, the “Progressive Policy Institute” of the New Democrats in the US, the self proclaimed “leading” social science publisher *Polity* and the foundation *Italianieuropei*) have learned from the success of the neoliberal advocacy tanks.¹⁵ In particular the “new social democratic” networks have to some extent successfully challenged neoliberal hegemony in the 1990s. However, it is not all that easy to clearly distinguish utopian neoliberalism from the communitarian versions of neoliberalism promoted by Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder, and the New Democrats in the US. A more serious challenge to neoliberal hegemony may arise from the global networking activities of the new left “anti (neoliberal) capitalism” movement, though it is too early to fully assess the knowledge creation and distribution capacities of this diverse group, let alone their weight relative to existing neoliberal networks. In any case, comparative research is needed to examine the role of anti-globalization networks in resisting and potentially transforming neoliberal hegemony. Our hypothesis is that to date no force has emerged that can match the neoliberal networks in terms of organizational capacities, knowledge production and dissemination on a wide range of policy issues.¹⁶

The evidence we present in Annex 1 gives some indication of the scope and organization of these networks.¹⁷ It catalogues the list of neoliberal advocacy think tanks defined as specialized or diversified ideology and knowledge organizations set up to establish and/or defend neoliberal hegemony in diverse social arenas such as the academic system, political consulting, mass media, and general public opinion and discursive and policy fields (e.g. economic theory, affirmative action etc.) *with direct links* to MPS members (as founders, board members and/or senior officials) in alphabetic order. The work of some of the

¹⁵ John Gray can be regarded as an outstanding example of a new right renegade with intimate knowledge of neoliberal think tanks. After supporting the Thatcherite movement in various intellectual functions, Gray defected to join the new labour movement of Tony Blair. In the high times of neoliberalism he was a member of the MPS, but as he recognized the „False Dawn“ (Gray 1998) he did quit the Society in 1996 (Walpen 2004: 379).

¹⁶ See Krugman (2001) for an excellent example of the effectiveness of a think tank campaign against a proposed inheritance tax (labelled death tax by the Heritage Foundation).

¹⁷ A larger effort is underway to establish a database of more complete networks of neoliberal advocacy think tanks and can be assessed at the web page of the study group *Buena Vista Neoliberal?* (www-buena-vista-neoliberal.de). We wish here to acknowledge the able research assistance of our colleague Werner Krämer in compiling this database.

institutes such as the Fraser Institute in Canada, Heritage Foundation in Washington, the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute in the United Kingdom or Germany's Frankfurter Institut – Marktwirtschaft und Politik are very well known at the national level, while some of them even earned an international reputation. However, the *collective* efforts in many of the better and lesser-known institutes engage have so far escaped attention. One example is the collaboration of several of these think tanks in the production of the Freedom of the World Report, which is used by neoliberal intellectuals (e.g. Norberg 2001) to provide counter information to some of the findings of the development index (known as the Human Development Report) published yearly by the United Nations.

While a large concentration of MPS related think tanks can be found in the US and in the UK, it is important to underscore that neoliberal advocacy think tanks have proliferated in all world regions as the breakdown of think tanks by world regions and countries in Table 5 shows.

Table 5: Advocacy Think Tanks with primary links to MPS by world region and country

World Region / Countries			
North America	41	Asia	7
USA	35	Hongkong	1
Canada	2	India	2
Mexico	4	Japan	1
		Taiwan	2
Europe	36	Israel	1
Great Britain	7		
Germany	5	Africa	2
France	5	South Africa	2
Belgium	2		
Switzerland	3	Australia	3
Poland	3	Australia	2
Austria	2	New Zealand	1
Turkey	1		
Sweden	2	South America	15
Slovak Republic	1	Peru	3
Ireland	1	Chile	3
Iceland	1	Brazil	3
Italy	1	Gutatemala	2
Tszech Republic	1	El Salvador	1
Spain	1	Uruguay	1
		Argentina	1
		Venezuela	1

Source: Internet and various other sources provided by Think Tanks with specified links to MPS (see annex 1 on the method).

Another interesting aspect with regard to the rise of organized neoliberal knowledge networks and hegemony relates to the timing of institutionalisation processes related to advocacy think tanks. Founding and networking activities begin in earnest after the Second World War, despite the earlier founding of a few institutes which can be regarded as important to “neoliberalism avant la lettre.”¹⁸ The growth of neoliberal institutes has been steady, though relatively slow until the 1970s with 18 new advocacy think tanks compared to 5 during the 1960s. Still, the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s was preceded by the setting up of a number of advocacy think tanks that early on interpreted the failures of Keynesianism and welfare statism. The largest number of neoliberal advocacy tanks has nevertheless been established in the 1980s and 1990s (30 and 23, respectively; Walpen 2004: 405). The demise of demand side policies and the sharp contraction of the welfare state did not lead to a self-satisfied withdrawal of the neoliberal movements. Rather, the organizational capacities of neoliberal networks have been steadily increased since neoliberalism became the dominant discourse in the early 1980s. No less than 45 new institutes have been added to the phalanx of neoliberal centres of knowledge production and dissemination and the number continue to grow, particularly in areas that have become integrated into the global capitalist economy more recently.

Due to the scale and scope of neoliberal advocacy think tanks it is virtually impossible to briefly summarize the subject areas covered by their research, publication and campaign activities. The Washington based Heritage Foundation single handed offers comprehensive advice in many if not all US public policy matters, for example by way of publishing its government program, the “Mandate for Leadership”. Publishing government programs has become an effort shared by sister institutes in Europe. Scrutinizing the web sites of the MPS related think tanks yields a list of subject categories presented in table 6 which might nevertheless be useful to assess the breadth and depth of neoliberal research and policy advisory activities carried out by individual organizations and in cooperation between think tanks

¹⁸ These include the US Hoover Institution (1919) and Rappards Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales (IUHEI) in Geneva (1927).

Table 6: Subject areas of neoliberal advocacy think tanks

Economics
Economic Policy / Support / Growth
Economic Education / Propagating the Market Economy
Privatisation
Regulation / Deregulation
Labor Market / Wages / Employment
International Trade / Free Trade / Globalization
Europe/ European Union / European Monetary System
Consumer Protection / Risk
Development / Politics of Transition (from Socialism to Capitalism)
Law and Society
Legal Protection / Institutional protection of private economic activity
Rule of Law / order of market economy
Criminal Law / Crime
Government and social/economic Infrastructures
Efficiency / Limitation of Government
Taxes / State Budget
Social Minimum Security / Welfare / Philanthropy
Family / Moral Values
Gender / Feminism
Migration / Racism
Pensions
Health Politics
Postal Service / Transport/ Infrastructure
Telecommunications / Internet
Energy Politics
Ecology / Environmental Protection
Regions / Federalism
Education and Media
Higher Education
Schools / Pedagogics
Science / Technology
Media / Public Discourse / Culture
Philosophy / Ideological fundamentals
Theoretical Fundament / Theory History
Monitoring (of left wing activities)
Foreign Policy / Military
Networking /Cooperation of Think Tanks

Source: web sites of 104 MPS related think tanks (see Annex 1, compare www.buena-vista-neoliberal.de. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Werner Kraemer on the coverage of policy issues and clustering of subject areas.)

Obviously not all think tanks work on all of these or even a majority of these subjects. But many issue areas are now covered not only by individual think tanks but also by groups of think tanks. Apart from the general coordination activities for many of the think tanks listed in annex 1 by the Atlas Foundation in the United States, many issue specific networks of neoliberal think tanks have been created in recent years, such as the “Economic Freedom Network” (collaborating around the globe on the yearly Freedom of the World Reports), the “Stockholm Network” of think tanks across Western Europe (concerned with neoliberal advice for the direction of European integration politics), the “Balkan Network” and the expanded “3E Network” (including think tanks from all over Eastern Europe) providing neoliberal guidance for the transition from Socialism to Capitalism or the US State Policy Network covering neoliberal think tanks in each state in the US. Due to the close links between and the increasingly intensive cooperation of many of these neoliberal advocacy think tanks, it is very easy to spread work across countries, to effectively divide labor, and to create “knowledge, policy and discourse campaigns” if need is perceived.¹⁹

In assessing the role of think tank networks in the production and reproduction of neoliberal hegemony, what is critical is the collective capacity of the network to resist challenges to this hegemony, not the activities of any individual organization. Those who predict neoliberalism’s demise in light of the rising critique against it and “corporate-led” or “capitalist globalization” may not be aware of or seriously underestimate the entrenched power of neoliberal networks of knowledge production to meet this challenge, as they have many others before. The networks that have mobilized quite effectively in recent years to challenge neoliberal hegemony may yet have to learn from the “technology”²⁰ of neoliberal masters in the art of creating and running advocacy think tanks, and may have to strengthen certain characteristics more typically to be found in “complex organizations” (Perrow) and intelligently coupled interorganizational networks (i.e. comprehensive co-ordination) to gain an effectiveness and comprehensiveness with regard to the everyday and multi-issue struggles influencing public opinion similar to the extremely well organized neoliberal networks of knowledge production and dissemination (compare George 1997).

3. Process dynamics and relations of forces: Concluding remarks

¹⁹ Two recent campaigns concentrate on arguments against Jeremy Rifkin’s analysis of “the end of work” and globalisation critiques advanced by the new social protest movements.

²⁰ The technology school or contingency theory in organization studies „focuses on something more or less analytically independent of structure and goals – the tasks or techniques utilized in organizations. (“Technology” is used here in its generic sense of the study of techniques or tasks; Perrow 1986: 141) The Neo-Weberian approach as described by Perrow also has to offer interesting insights with regard to advocacy think tank research. It starts out from a specific understanding of “communication”: “...communication strategies center around checkpoints in the channels, the specialization of channels, the widening and deepening of favored channels that may bypass key stations inadvertently, the development of organizational vocabularies that screen out some parts of reality and magnify others parts, and the attention-directing, cue-establishing nature of communication techniques” (125).

We can thus observe both a widening and deepening of neoliberal networks of intellectuals and advocacy think tanks, a considerable increase in reach and scope around the globe as well as specific national and supranational arenas and discourse areas.²¹ Neoliberal knowledge production and dissemination certainly has not declined in the most recent period, rather the opposite: A very solid intellectual force and constitutive part of historical power blocs that defend and maintain neoliberal hegemonic constellations is strongly entrenched in many (civil and political) societies around the globe, capable of working on almost any subject of concern, and able to strategically develop capacities and competencies if needed. Reliable and tested channels of communication can be used to eventually disseminate the result of the work, and the neoliberal networks are capable to rapidly change tactics.

Underscoring this reality is particularly important given the recent attention afforded to the supposed emergence of a post-Washington Consensus, representing a kinder, gentler version of globalization. The World Bank's discovery that "institutions matter" and ubiquitous references to the importance of good or global governance, which pervade the international financial institution's discourse today, should not be interpreted as evidence for neoliberalism's defeat. In fact, many of the recent critiques of neoliberalism and the proposed reforms, which arise from them, turn out to be consistent with a pluralist neoliberal agenda. Many neoliberals agree that the state should be strengthened in order to secure the institutional foundation of a market economy. A close look at the statement of aims of the Mont Pèlerin Society reminds us that neoliberalism's core tenets cannot be reduced to vulgar market radicalism, but rather include reflection on the appropriate role of a limited state. Thus, neoliberalism's opponents do themselves a disservice in defining their opposition against this straw man.

²¹ A closer analysis of a range of more specific discourse and power *relations* in which the neoliberal networks of intellectuals and think tanks are a key force is beyond the scope of this chapter. We have discussed the case of European integration elsewhere (Plehwe and Walpen 2004) as a good example of the relative influence of organized neoliberals. While long term MPS member and one time president Herbert Giersch (1985) successfully introduced the "Eurosclerosis" analysis underpinning the single market program in the 1980s, organized neoliberals found themselves fighting an uphill battle in the 1990s with regard to new efforts to further develop the *political* union of Europe, namely to draft a European constitution. Within a very short period of time, however, the 1992 founded European Constitutional Group (www.european-constitutional-group.org) was mobilized to draft a neoliberal constitution. Seven of the ten original members (from six different countries) share the commonality of MPS membership and access to domestic think tank channels used to disseminate their collective work. In a parallel effort, new supra- and transnational think tank capacities have been developed by the neoliberal camp. In 1993, German and British members of the MPS network introduced the *Centre for a New Europe (CNE)* – the first neoliberal think tank designed to play a role at the supranational level. In addition to the CNE, the *Stockholm Network* has been created in 1997. The British think tank *Civitas*, a year 2000 spin off from the Institute of Economic Affairs has been given the task to coordinate the work of associated neoliberal advocacy think tanks in England, France, Belgium, and Germany as well as corresponding partners in other member states of the European Union (and the US Galen Institute). Compare Bohle and Neunhöffer in this volume on the role of organized neoliberals in the socialist transformation discourse, and Weller and Singleton in this volume on the development discourse, particularly the reform debate on International Financial Institutions.

Indeed, part of the reason why it is not easy to distinguish anti-neoliberals and neoliberals is because the left lacks a coherent statement of an alternative that makes it clear what it is for, as opposed to what it is against. Nevertheless a principled effort to overcome neoliberal hegemony must entail a statement of aims similar in scope to those that have guided the MPS, and it must include a consideration of the kind of transnational organizational capacities needed to cope with and counteract the scope and achievements of neoliberal networks of intellectuals and think tanks. Bidding neoliberalism a premature adieu fails to understand that neoliberal hegemony does not find expression in the achievement of a defined end state of “neoliberalism”; rather, neoliberal hegemony is better understood as the capacity to permanently influence political and economic developments along neoliberal lines, both by setting the agenda for what constitutes appropriate and good government, and criticizing any deviations from the neoliberal course as wrong-headed, misguided, or dangerous. The working principle and hegemonic strategy of radical neoliberalism in any case is not concerned with specific details and political compromises; neoliberal networks of intellectuals and advocacy think tanks predominantly aim to influence the terms of the debate in order to safeguard neoliberal trajectories. Our analysis of the Mont Pèlerin Society and the neoliberal networks that are its descendants suggest that a core aspect of this endeavour, and one of the keys of its success, is the ongoing process of knowledge production and dissemination, as well as the relative absenteeism from power.

Annex 1: Advocacy Think Tanks with direct relations to MPS members

	<i>Name</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>
1.	Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty	USA	1990
2.	The Adam Smith Institute (ASI)	GB	1977
3.	Agencia Interamericana de Prensa Económica AIPE)	USA	1991
4.	American Enterprise Institute (AEI)	USA	1943
5.	Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft (ASM)	D	1953
6.	Association for Liberal Thinking (ALT)	TR	1994
7.	Association pour les Libertés Economiques et le Progrès Social (ALEPS)	F	1968
8.	Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (AIMS)	CDN	1995
9.	Atlas Economic Research Foundation	USA	1981
10.	Carl Menger Institut	A	in the 1980s
11.	Cato Institute	USA	1977
12.	Center for Private Conservation (CPC -> CEI)	USA	2000
13.	Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE)	PL	1991
14.	Centre for Civil Society	IND	1997
15.	Centre for the New Europe (CNE)	B	1993
16.	Centre International d’Études pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme	F	1938-1939
17.	Centre Jouffroy Pour la Réflexion Monétaire	F	1974

18.	Centre d'Etudes du Développement International et des Mouvements Economiques et Sociaux (CEDIMES)	F	1972
19.	Centre for the Independent Studies (CIS)	AUS	1976
20.	Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS)	AUS	1982
21.	Centre for Research into [Post-]Communist Economies (CRCE)	GB	1983
22.	The Centre for the Study of Economic and Religion	ZA	N/A
23.	Centro de Divulgación del Conocimiento Económico (CEDICE)	YV	1984
24.	Centro de Estudio Sobre la Libertad (CESL)	RA	1957
25.	Centro de Estudios Economico Sociales (CEES)	GCA	1959
26.	Centro de Estudios Públicos	RCH	1980
27.	Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social (CERES)	ROU	N/A
28.	Centro de Investigaciones Sobre la Libre Empresa (CISLE)	MEX	1984
29.	Centro Einaudi	I	1963
30.	Centro Mises	MEX	in the 1950s
31.	Centrum im. Adama Smitha (CAS)	PL	1989
32.	Chung-hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER)	RC	1981
33.	Civitas, the Institute for the Study of Civil Society	GB	2000
34.	The Claremont Institute	USA	1979
35.	Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)	USA	1984
36.	David Hume Institute (DHI)	GB	1985
37.	Foundation for Economic Education (FEE)	USA	1946
38.	Foundation Francisco Marroquin (FFM)	GCA	1980
39.	Foundation for International Studies	USA	N/A
40.	Frankfurter Institut - Stiftung für Marktwirtschaft und Politik (Kronberger Kreis)	D	1982
41.	Fraser Institute	CDN	1974
42.	Free Market Foundation (FMF)	ZA	1975
43.	Friedrich A. von Hayek-Gesellschaft	D	1998
44.	Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS)	D	1958
45.	The Heartland Institue	USA	1984
46.	Heritage Foundation	USA	1973
47.	The Hong Kong Centre for Economic Research (HKCER)	HKG (TJ)	1987
48.	Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace	USA	1919
49.	The Howard Center for Family, Religion, and Society	USA	1997
50.	The Independent Institute	USA	1985
51.	Independent Women's Forum (IWF)	USA	1991
52.	Institut Economique de Paris	F	in the 1970s
53.	Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales (IUHEI)	CH	1927

54.	Institute for Contemporary Studies	USA	1974
55.	Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)	GB	1955
56.	Institute for Humane Affairs	USA	N/A
57.	Institute for Human Studies	USA	1961
58.	Instituto Cultural Ludwig von Mises (ICUMI)	MEX	1983
59.	Instituto de Economía Política	RCH	in the 1970s
60.	Instituto de Estudos Empresariais	BR	1984
61.	Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales	ES	N/A
62.	Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales (IIES)	MEX	1955
63.	Instituto de Libre Empresa (ILE)	PE	N/A
64.	Instituto de Economía de Libre Mercado (IELM)	PE	N/A
65.	Instituto Libertad y Democracia	PE	1980
66.	Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas e Sociais	BR	N/A
67.	Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową (IBnGR) Institute for Researches in Market Economy)	PL	1989
68.	Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI)	USA	1953
69.	International Institute of Austrian Economics (IIAE)	A	1993
70.	International Policy Network (IPN)	GB	1971
71.	Israel Center for Social & Economic Progress (ICSEP)	IL	1984
72.	James Madison Institute (JMI)	USA	1987
73.	John Locke Institute	USA	1990
74.	Jon Thorlaksson Institute	IS	1983
75.	Liberal Institute	BR	1983
76.	Liberales Institute	CH	1979
77.	Liberální Institut	CZ	1990
78.	Libertad y Desarrollo (LyD)	RCH	1990
79.	Liberty Fund, Inc.	USA	1960
80.	Liberty Institute	IND	in the 1990s
81.	Ludwig von Mises Institute (LVMI)	USA	1982
82.	Ludwig von Mises Institute Europe	B	1984
83.	Mackinac Center for Public Policy	USA	1987
84.	Manhattan Institute	USA	1978
85.	Nadácia F. A. Hayeka (NFAH)	SK	1991
86.	Nomura Research Institute	J	1965
87.	Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy Research (PRI)	USA	1979
88.	Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research	USA	1988
89.	Political Economy Research Center - The Center for Free Market Environmentalism (PERC)	USA	1980
90.	Ratio Institute	S	2002
91.	Reason Foundation	USA	1978
92.	Reason Public Policy Institute (RPPI)	USA	1997
93.	Rockford Institute	USA	1976
94.	Ronald Coase Institute (USA)	USA	1996

95.	Sociedad para el Estudio de la Acción Humana (SEAH)	E	1991
96.	Schweizerisches Institut für Auslandsforschung (SIAF)	CH	1943
97.	Skrabanek Foundation (SF)	IRL	1994
98.	The Smith Center for Private Enterprise Studies	USA	1991
99.	The Social Affairs Unit (SAU)	GB	1980
100.	State Policy Network (SPN)	USA	1992
101.	Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER)	RC	1976
102.	Tasman Institute	NZ	1990
103.	Timbro Free Market Institute (S)	S	1978
104.	Walter-Eucken-Institut (D)	D	1954

Source: Internet and literature based search for think tanks which have either been founded by MPS members or which include MPS members in senior positions. MPS membership data was compiled from member lists available at the Liberaal Archief, Gent, Belgium (see Walpen 2004: 399-408).

The international country abbreviations are taken from: www.iol.ie/~taeger/tables/tab9.htm.